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CRAWFORD, DAVIS, AND WAY BEYOND 
Richard D. Friedman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution hardly mattered.1 It was 
not applicable against the states, and therefore had no role what-
soever in the vast majority of prosecutions. Moreover, if a fed-
eral court was inclined to exclude evidence of an out-of-court 
statement, it made little practical difference whether the court 
termed the statement hearsay or held that the evidence did not 
comply with the Confrontation Clause. 
But the Supreme Court’s decision in Pointer v. Texas2 to ap-
ply the Clause to the states meant that, potentially at least, the 
Clause mattered a great deal. The Court could invoke the 
Clause, as it did in Pointer itself, to hold that evidence of a 
statement could not be admitted in a state prosecution, notwith-
standing that the evidence complied with the state’s hearsay 
law.3 And the steady liberalization of hearsay law, which was 
advanced by adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 
and by subsequent codifications based on those Rules adopted by 
most of the states, increased the potential significance of the 
Confrontation Clause; it meant that black-letter hearsay law 
                                                          
 * Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School. 
1 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
2 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
3 See also, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
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would pose no obstacle to some statements that the federal 
courts might nonetheless determine to violate the confrontation 
right. 
The impact of the Clause was limited, however, by the fact 
that the Supreme Court did not have a good conception of what 
the Clause meant. The Clause seemed to require the exclusion of 
some hearsay, but treating it as excluding all hearsay would be 
intolerable. The Court floundered, eventually articulating in 
Ohio v. Roberts4 a rationale that the Clause was meant to ex-
clude only unreliable hearsay, and leaning heavily on the estab-
lished and expanding body of hearsay exemptions to determine 
what was reliable.5 Consequently, the Clause still had only a 
very limited effect. The lower courts usually could find a basis 
for admitting a statement, either by fitting it within an exemp-
tion or making a case-specific determination of reliability.6 And, 
though the Supreme Court occasionally swooped down and held 
the admission of a given statement to be a violation of the 
Clause,7 the law was highly unpredictable because it was not 
rooted in any solid underlying theory.8 
Crawford v. Washington9 changed the landscape dramati-
cally. In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Confronta-
tion Clause does not constitutionalize the prevailing law of hear-
say.10 Rather, it enunciates a simple and long-standing 
procedural rule: A prosecution witness must give testimony in 
                                                          
4 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
5 Id. at 66 (“Reliability can be inferred without more where the evidence 
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”). 
6 Note the catalogue of cases reviewed in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 63-65 (2004). 
7 E.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Idaho v. Wright, 497 
U.S. 805 (1990). 
8 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (“The framework is 
so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core 
confrontation violations.”); id. at 68 n.10 (“the Roberts test is inherently, and 
therefore permanently, unpredictable”).  
9 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
10 Id. at 60-62. 
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the presence of the accused, subject to cross-examination.11 
Therefore, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it 
may not be admitted against an accused unless the accused has 
had (or forfeited) an opportunity to examine the witness, and 
even then it will be accepted only if the witness is unavailable to 
testify at trial.12 
Doctrinally, the transformation was remarkably broad and 
swift. The upshot is that we are at the threshold of a new era. 
This is the first time that the Confrontation Clause really has a 
substantial impact in itself; put another way, this is the first time 
that the distinction between the commands of the Clause and the 
contents of ordinary hearsay law will really be significant. Many 
basic questions will have to be rethought, or approached com-
pletely from scratch. That is intellectually very exciting. More-
over, because the change is so new and broad, fears that the tes-
timonial approach will prove to be as indeterminate as the 
reliability-oriented approach that it replaced are, I believe, mis-
guided. The reliability approach was incoherent and failed to ex-
press any principle worth protecting. Therefore, it was, as Jus-
tice Scalia said in Crawford, permanently unpredictable.13 
Given that the new world of the testimonial approach is a lit-
tle more than two years old, one cannot expect that by now all 
significant questions would have been resolved and that the 
lower courts would all apply those resolutions smoothly and 
consistently. Indeed, in arguing Hammon v. Indiana,14 I sug-
gested that the Court not try to do too much all at once; rather, 
the Court should be attempting to build a framework that will 
last for centuries, and it is more important that it be built well 
                                                          
11 Id. at 59. 
12 Id. Crawford also holds out the possibility that statements fitting 
within the “dying declaration” exception to the hearsay rule might fall outside 
the confrontation right. Id. at 56 n.7. In my view, the proper way to handle 
dying declarations is through the doctrine of forfeiture rather than by creating 
an exception to the right. 
13 Id. at 68 n.10. 
14 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), decided sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 
S. Ct. 552 (2006). 
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than that it be built quickly.15 And in the end, just as in Craw-
ford, the Court decided Hammon and its companion, Davis v. 
Washington,16 without offering a comprehensive definition of 
what “testimonial” means. Now, though, we have some addi-
tional guideposts: The statements at issue in Hammon are testi-
monial, while the key ones at issue in Davis are deemed not to 
be. 
In Part I of this Article, I discuss Davis and Hammon and 
the fundamental question of how a court should determine 
whether a statement is testimonial. I conclude that the Davis 
opinion is consistent with what I believe is the best approach, 
one that asks what the anticipation would be of a reasonable per-
son in the position of the declarant. Part II analyzes ambiguities 
in the operational test created by Davis. I believe that the “ongo-
ing emergency” doctrine stated by Davis was intended to be 
quite narrow, but that lower courts are likely to treat it quite 
broadly. Part III then discusses whether a statement can be tes-
timonial only if it was made formally. Davis appeared to point 
in different directions with respect to this question. I conclude 
that on the best view of the case either there is no formality re-
quirement or, if there is such a requirement, it adds nothing to 
the requirement that the statement be made in anticipation of 
prosecutorial use. In Part IV, I offer a brief draft of an opinion 
that the Court might have written, reaching the same results that 
it did in Davis and Hammon but yielding less leeway for ma-
nipulation by the lower courts. Part V summarizes some of the 
other major issues that must be resolved in coming years to 
generate a sound and coherent understanding of the 
confrontation right. Finally, Part VI presents interrelated 
thoughts on pedagogy and law reform. I contend that the 
confrontation right should drive the discussion of hearsay in 
Evidence courses, and that the transformation of confrontation 
doctrine should cause us to consider radically reshaping the 
ordinary law of hearsay. 
                                                          
15 Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct. 
2266 (2006) (No. 05-5705), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/05-5705.pdf (hereinafter “Hammon Transcript”). 
16 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). 
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I.  DAVIS, HAMMON, AND FRAMEWORK QUESTIONS 
The holdings of the Supreme Court in Davis and Hammon 
are better, I believe, than the results most of the lower courts 
had reached, but not as good as they should have been. 
In Hammon, the police came to the Hammon house in re-
sponse to a domestic disturbance call. Though Amy Hammon at 
first denied that anything was wrong, she gave them permission 
to enter. They saw signs that there had been an altercation, and 
Hershel Hammon told them that he and Amy had had an argu-
ment, but he denied that it had become physical. One officer 
remained with Hershel while the other spoke with Amy in an-
other room. This time, in response to further questioning, she 
said that Hershel had hit her. Amy failed to appear at Hershel’s 
trial on a domestic battery charge, and so the prosecution, over 
Hershel’s objection, offered the officer’s account of what Amy 
had told her. Hershel was convicted, the Indiana courts af-
firmed, but the United States Supreme Court reversed. 
If Hammon had lost in the Supreme Court, then we would 
have created a system in which a complainant could create evi-
dence for trial simply by making an accusation to a police offi-
cer in her living room, at least so long as the accused was not in 
the same room and was in the presence of another officer. The 
Supreme Court would have endorsed the toleration, demon-
strated by most courts in the years before Crawford and by 
many even afterwards, of a practice that should be deemed a 
core violation of the Confrontation Clause. 
That practice, which Bridget McCormack and I have labeled 
“dial-in testimony,” took advantage of the Court’s pre-
Crawford holding that a statement deemed to fit within the juris-
diction’s hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations was ex-
empt from the Confrontation Clause.17 By invoking some re-
markably generous interpretations of the hearsay exception, 
courts routinely admitted accusatory statements made to authori-
ties, even if made hours after the incident and even if the ac-
                                                          
17 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992). 
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cuser was present but did not testify.18 Moreover, many courts, 
presumably having gotten so accustomed to the practice, found it 
almost unthinkable to do without it and continued to tolerate it 
after Crawford.19 But once one understands and accepts in good 
faith the transformation wrought by Crawford, 
Hammon becomes an easy case, and the opinion of the Court re-
flects that fact.20 
Davis was plainly a much tougher case. When the complain-
ant, Michelle McCottry, spoke to a 911 operator, she was still 
in distress, the assault having allegedly occurred just moments 
before—so recently that she spoke in the present tense. She was 
not yet protected by a police officer, and the accused remained 
at large.21 
Nonetheless, I thought that Davis should have won. In argu-
ing our respective cases, Jeff Fisher, who was Davis’s counsel, 
and I contended for a simple, intuitively appealing proposition 
that would have clarified the law greatly if it had been adopted: 
that an accusation of crime made to a police officer or other law 
enforcement official is testimonial.22 
But the Supreme Court declined to take so broad a view. 
The Court enunciated a test that, while not comprehensive, it 
regarded as adequate to resolve these cases: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances 
                                                          
18 See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (2002). 
19 Note, for example, the set of cases in which the Supreme Court, after 
deciding Davis and Hammon, granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded for 
reconsideration. These are analyzed in a memorandum prepared by the Public 
Defender Service for the District of Columbia and available at 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/search?q=o%27toole. 
20 126 S. Ct. at 2278 (Hammon ”much easier” than Davis, the state-
ments being “not much different” from those found to be testimonial in 
Crawford). 
21 Id. at 2279. 
22 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 
2266 (2006) (No. 05-5224), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/05-5224.pdf; Hammon Transcript, at 3. 
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objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary pur-
pose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu-
tion.23 
Even under this test, I think Davis should have won. It ap-
pears to me that the purpose of the conversation—on the parts 
both of McCottry and of the 911 operator—was not to provide 
immediate protection to McCottry. In fact, Davis was evidently 
leaving the house as the call began, McCottry expressed no fear 
that he would return in the immediate future, and the operator 
told her that the police were first going to find the accused and 
then come talk to the complainant.24 Had the operator been con-
cerned that the accused was likely to return to the house in the 
immediate future, then her statement to McCottry would make 
no sense at all; rather than roaming the streets of the city look-
ing for the accused, at least one officer should have been posted 
to the house in case he returned there. Clearly, the aim of the 
state’s agents, and presumably also the desire of the complain-
ant, was that the accused be arrested and that sanctions—at least 
for violating the restraining order mentioned in the call by the 
complainant, and perhaps also for criminal violations—be im-
posed on him. 
More fundamentally, though, I do not believe that the deci-
sive question in deciding whether a statement is testimonial 
should be one of “primary purpose,” either of the declarant or 
of the state agents. Determining a “primary purpose” is of 
course a difficult matter because so often, as Justice Thomas 
correctly pointed out in his dissent, the questioner has more than 
                                                          
23 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). 
24 Id. at 2271. In fact, it appears that the officers did go directly to 
McCottry, but that was not the anticipation of the parties to the conversation. 
Id. 
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one important purpose, and they may meld together.25 Labeling 
one purpose after the fact as primary seems to be a rather arbi-
trary exercise26—and thus the test invites manipulation to en-
hance the chance that the evidence will be received.27 
Furthermore, why should the purpose of the questioner mat-
ter? I have previously stated at length reasons why, in determin-
ing whether a statement is testimonial, the witness’ perspective 
should be the crucial one.28 And, curiously, it seems the 
Davis Court agreed. Dispelling one of the fallacies adopted by 
some lower courts in the wake of Crawford, the Court made 
very clear that statements made absent interrogation—
volunteered statements or ones made in response to open-ended 
questions—may be testimonial.29 Further, the Court stated, “And 
                                                          
25 Id. at 2283 (“In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a 
report of a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or other-
wise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the 
police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather evi-
dence.”). 
26 Id. at 2284-85. 
27 Of course, even the test that I think is optimal, based on the reason-
able anticipation of a person in the position of the declarant, is potentially 
manipulable. See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006). Indeed, 
in some circumstances a test based on the primary purpose of the questioner 
is more likely to lead to a conclusion that the statement is testimonial, be-
cause whatever the understanding of a reasonable person in the declarant’s 
position, it is not reasonably deniable that the questioner solicited the state-
ment for forensic purposes. See, e.g., State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 
2006). Nevertheless, I believe that a test based on the primary purpose of the 
questioner will be more subject to manipulation, because often the ques-
tioner—frequently a police officer or some other repeat witness who is part of 
the criminal justice system—will learn to recite a formula that will give a 
friendly court cover for concluding that the questioner’s primary purpose was 
not forensic. 
28 See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimo-
nial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 255-59 (2005) [hereinafter Grappling]. 
29 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006) (“The Framers 
were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony 
or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to de-
tailed interrogation.”). In Grappling, supra note 28, at 263-66, adapted from a 
posting titled “The Interrogation Bugaboo” that I made to The Confrontation 
Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Jan. 20, 2005, 1:12 EST), I have 
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of course even when interrogation exists . . . it is in the final 
analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s ques-
tions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”30 
So how do we reconcile these divergent statements? I am in-
clined to believe that the Court (or at least a substantial portion 
of it) does recognize that the declarant’s perspective is the better 
one, and that at least the Court has not rejected that perspective. 
Consider this thought experiment. Suppose there is a statement 
not made in response to interrogation that, under whatever the 
applicable test may be, is testimonial; as I have just noted, 
Crawford explicitly recognized that there are such statements, 
and plainly the test for determining that such statements are tes-
timonial can have nothing to do with interrogation. Now suppose 
that the same statement is made in identical circumstances except 
that it is in response to an interrogation conducted primarily for 
the purpose of resolving an ongoing emergency. So now the 
statement is characterized as nontestimonial under Davis. But 
why would the purpose of the interrogator preempt whatever the 
underlying standard was that led to the statement being charac-
terized as testimonial absent the interrogation? Most likely, I be-
lieve, the Court does recognize (or would if forced to confront 
the matter) the existence of some broad, underlying standard that 
has nothing to do with an interrogator’s purpose. Such a view is 
easily consistent with a perception that if the statement is taken 
in response to an interrogation conducted largely to resolve an 
emergency, the probability is very small that the statement 
would be characterized as testimonial under that underlying stan-
dard. 
In this view, Davis is perfectly compatible with a general 
test based on the anticipation of a reasonable person in the posi-
tion of the declarant. The Court might well believe that, if a 
statement is made in response to an interrogation and the inter-
rogation was conducted primarily for the purpose of resolving an 
emergency, then it is highly unlikely that a reasonable person in 
                                                          
discussed the fallacy that only statements made in response to interrogation can 
be testimonial. 
30 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1. 
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the declarant’s position would anticipate that the statement would 
be used for prosecution; it might be unlikely both because the 
circumstances that govern the interrogator also affect the decla-
rant, and because the fact and nature of the interrogation govern 
the declarant’s understanding of the situation. And the Court 
might believe that the interrogator’s purpose is more easily de-
terminable in this setting than is the declarant’s understanding. 
This view is supported by the fact that in Davis the Court 
slipped easily into speaking about the call from the viewpoint of 
the declarant. According to the Court, “McCottry’s call was 
plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat,”31 and 
“[s]he was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past.”32 
Similarly, in discussing Crawford, the Court spoke of factors 
that “strengthened the statements’ testimonial aspect—made it 
more objectively apparent, that is, that the purpose of the exer-
cise was to nail down the truth about past criminal 
events . . . .”33 
This view also gains strength with a focus on an ambiguity 
in the declarant-perspective test that has not received much open 
discussion.34 When we speak of the anticipation of a reasonable 
person in the declarant’s position, we are referring to a hypo-
thetical person who has all the information about the particular 
situation that the declarant does, and no more. Thus, if the de-
clarant is speaking to an undercover police officer, the hypo-
thetical person would not know that her audience is collecting 
information for use in prosecution. 
But the question then is whether the anticipation of the 
reasonable person should be assessed (a) from the vantage point 
that the declarant actually occupied, speaking in the heat of the 
moment, or (b) as if she considered the probable use of her 
statement after the fact, reflecting calmly while sitting in an 
armchair. Arguably, the better perspective is from the armchair, 
because that would help the Confrontation Clause achieve its 
                                                          
31 Id. at 2276. 
32 Id. at 2279. 
33 Id. at 2278 (emphasis added). 
34 But cf. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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goal of preventing the creation of a system that allows prosecu-
tors to use testimony not given subject to confrontation. The 
armchair view is a very tough sell, however. The path of least 
resistance is to conclude that the heat-of-the-moment view is the 
proper one, because it focuses on the actual circumstances of the 
declarant when she made the statement. And, to the extent the 
Davis Court focused on the intent or anticipation of the decla-
rant, it seems clearly to have taken the heat-of-the-moment 
view. 
I believe that even under that view the statements in 
Davis should have been deemed testimonial. But the opposite 
conclusion is certainly plausible; a caller in McCottry’s position 
might not, in the heat of the moment, consider the prospect of 
prosecutorial use of her statements unless her attention was 
called to it. In short, it may well be that the Court’s conclusion 
that McCottry’s statement was not testimonial rested on a per-
ception that a reasonable person in her position would not, in the 
heat of the moment, anticipate prosecutorial use. I therefore do 
not think we can draw from Davis any inference adverse to gen-
eral application of the declarant-perspective approach. 
II.  OPERATIONAL AMBIGUITIES 
A test relying on the terms “primary purpose” and “ongoing 
emergency” is extremely ambiguous, and the Davis Court deep-
ened the ambiguity when it applied the test to the cases before 
it. I am afraid that this ambiguity will encourage many post-
Davis courts to approach cases, as they did in the Roberts era 
and in the brief Crawford-to-Davis era, by looking for whatever 
toehold they can find to admit accusatory statements that were 
made absent an opportunity for confrontation. 
Some aspects of the Davis opinion should, however, counsel 
a conscientious court to treat the “ongoing emergency” doctrine 
restrictively. The Court emphasized that “McCottry was speak-
ing about events as they were actually happening”35—and if this 
is not strictly accurate, the Court’s emphasis on the point is all 
                                                          
35 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006). 
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the more significant. Indeed, though the Court gave various in-
dications of when the emergency ended in Davis, it explicitly 
said the emergency ended “when Davis drove away from the 
premises”; subsequent statements would be testimonial, and re-
daction would be necessary.36 
Furthermore, the Court explicitly regarded Hammon as a 
“much easier” case—suggesting that the statements in 
Davis were close to the line and those in Hammon were not.37 
The Court said that when the officer elicited Amy Hammon’s 
oral accusation of her husband, “he was not seeking to deter-
mine (as in Davis) ‘what is happening,’ but ‘what happened.’”38 
And it was sufficient for the result that “Amy’s statements were 
neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling 
officers immediately to end a threatening situation.”39 
Moreover, the Court’s treatment of King v. Brasier,40 an 
English case from 1779, is highly significant. There, as the 
Davis Court indicated, a young girl, “immediately on her com-
ing home” after an assault, told her mother about the incident.41 
The Supreme Court distinguished Brasier, while appearing to 
endorse it. The case would be helpful to Davis if it more closely 
resembled the facts of his case, the Court said, “[b]ut by the 
time the victim got home, her story was an account of past 
events.”42 Thus, notwithstanding the immediacy of the report—
and also notwithstanding the facts that the declarant was a young 
child and that her audience included no law enforcement offi-
cers—the statement was testimonial. Significantly, that is just 
how the Brasier court referred to the child’s accusation, as tes-
timony.43 
                                                          
36 Id. at 2277. 
37 Id. at 2278. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 2279. 
40 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779). 
41 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006) (quoting 1 Leach 
199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202). The Davis court describes the girl as a rape victim, 
but the report of the case indicates that the crime was attempted rape.  
42 Id. at 2277. 
43 168 E.R. at 202-03 (holding that because “no testimony whatever can 
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The significance of Brasier for present purposes does not 
depend on whether the case was known in the United States at 
the time the Sixth Amendment was drafted or adopted.44 Bra-
sier made no new law relevant to the inquiry here; rather, its 
significance is that it reflects the common understanding of the 
time. 
The debated question in Brasier was whether, given the de-
clarant’s youth, her out-of-court statement could be admitted. A 
premise of the debate was that if she had been an adult the state-
ment could not have been used, because to allow it to be used 
would be to tolerate admission against the accused of testimony 
given out of court. 
Thus, Brasier indicates that a common understanding at the 
time of the framing of the Sixth Amendment was that an out-of-
court accusation, even one made very soon after the event, was 
testimonial in nature and therefore not admissible. Whatever the 
merits of originalism may be, in general or more narrowly as a 
method for construing the Confrontation Clause, such a deeply 
seated understanding of the confrontation right should be given 
considerable weight in determining the Clause’s modern mean-
ing. 
A conscientious court should therefore be persuaded not to 
stretch the idea of “ongoing emergency” very far at all. Yet a 
court inclined to do so—and I believe most are—has some mate-
rial to work with, beyond the notorious looseness in the term 
“emergency.” 
In Davis, the Court held that “even . . . the operator’s effort 
to establish the identity of the assailant” was necessary to re-
solve the emergency, “so that the dispatched officers might 
know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.”45 
This holding is highly significant given how often, as in Davis, 
                                                          
be legally received except upon oath,” the child’s statement to her mother 
and another woman “ought not to have been received”). 
44 Cf. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did 
They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. 
L. REV. 105, 157 n.163 (2005) (contending that Framers of the Confrontation 
Clause could not have known about Brasier). 
45 126 S.Ct. at 2276. 
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an identification statement is critical to the prosecution, but it 
strikes me as dubious. Would the officers, knowing no more 
than that they were trying to find someone accused of having 
just committed a violent crime of passion, be lax in their precau-
tions? My skepticism is deepened by the fact that there is no in-
dication that the 911 operator searched Davis’ record before the 
officers found him. 
Further, the Court noted that officers at a potential crime 
scene “need to know whom they are dealing with in order to as-
sess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible 
danger to the potential victim.”46 Preliminary indications lend 
force to the anticipation that courts frequently will seize upon 
this language as a license to admit any statement made before 
the accused is in custody or at least in the presence of an offi-
cer. It is significant that in Hammon itself the Indiana Supreme 
Court had held the statement admissible on the ground that it 
was necessary to allow the officers to secure and assess the 
situation.47 The United States Supreme Court rejected that con-
clusion, of course—but there is not much ground for confidence 
that in similar circumstances other lower courts would not reach 
the same conclusion that the Indiana Supreme Court did. 
In short, most of the indications from the Davis opinion are 
that the dividing line between testimonial and nontestimonial 
should lie much closer to the situation in Davis than to that in 
Hammon. Nonetheless, I believe that until the Supreme Court 
intervenes once again, most of the lower courts will place that 
line much closer to the situation in Hammon. 
III.  FORMALITY 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court pointed to the formality of 
the circumstances under which Sylvia Crawford made her state-
ments as a factor supporting the conclusion that the statements 
                                                          
46 Id. at 2279 (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 
U.S. 177, 186 (2004)). 
47 See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457-58 (Ind. 2005). 
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were testimonial.48 Some lower courts took this language for 
more than it was worth, by treating formality as a prerequisite 
for a statement to be considered testimonial.49 I believe this con-
clusion is fallacious and even wrong-headed.50 
In brief, formalities, including the oath and opportunity for 
cross-examination, are required conditions of acceptable testi-
mony. A statement is not rendered non-testimonial by the ab-
sence of formalities; rather, if the statement is genuinely testi-
monial in nature, the lack of formalities makes the statement 
unacceptable. A rule that only formal statements will be charac-
terized as testimonial is therefore theoretically backwards. 
Moreover, it creates a perverse incentive: those wanting to give 
or take testimony without it being subjected to confrontation 
could simply do so informally. 
Thus, I had hoped that the decisions in Davis and Hammon 
would put to rest the notion that to be characterized as testimo-
nial a statement must meet some standard of formality. My 
hopes were raised at argument, because not only was it obvious 
that Justice Scalia, the author of Crawford, understood the point, 
but he articulated it with some force.51 I would have offered 
                                                          
48 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
49 This was, for example, the view of the Indiana Court of Appeals in 
Hammon. 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (2004) (“It appears to us that the common 
denominator underlying the Supreme Court’s discussion of what constitutes a 
‘testimonial’ statement is the official and formal quality of such a state-
ment.”). 
50 For a fuller discussion of my view on this subject, see Grappling, su-
pra note 28, at 266-69, adapted from a Posting of Richard D. Friedman of 
“The Formality Bugaboo,” to The Confrontation Blog, 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com. 
51 Note the following dialogue between Justice Scalia and Thomas 
Fisher, the Indiana Solicitor General, shortly after Justice Scalia had posed a 
hypothetical involving an unsolicited accusatory affidavit. 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . [S]urely the affidavit isn’t—isn’t 
what’s magical. I mean, I’m going to change my hypothetical. 
The person recites his accusation on a tape recorder and mails 
the tape to the court. Now, are you going to say, well, it’s not 
an affidavit? You’d exclude that as well, wouldn’t you? 
 MR. FISHER: Well, I—I don’t know that I would because, 
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long odds at that point against the result that Justice Scalia 
would write an opinion for a majority of the Court that pre-
served even the possibility of a formality requirement. And yet 
that is just what happened. 
The Davis opinion appears to be the product of considerable 
compromise, and one of the chief pieces of evidence on point is 
the superficial ambiguity with which it deals with formality. In 
distinguishing Davis from Crawford, the Court relied in part on 
the greater formality of the circumstances under which the 
statement in Crawford was made.52 Moreover, in responding to 
Justice Thomas, who would have imposed quite a stringent for-
mality test, the Court said in a footnote, “We do not dispute that 
formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance.”53 
Prosecutors would be unwise, however, to celebrate the 
adoption of a meaningful formality requirement. The comparison 
of Davis and Crawford does not purport to adopt any such re-
                                                          
again, you’ve got the—you’ve got the form that Crawford was 
concerned about. The affidavit is the classic form. 
 JUSTICE SCALIA: That would make no sense at all. I 
mean, that—that is just the worst sort of formalism. If you do it 
in an affidavit, it’s—it’s bad, but if you put it on a tape, it’s—
it’s good. I—I cannot understand any reason for that. 
Hammon Transcript at 34-35. 
52 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276-77 (2006). 
53 Id. at 2278 n.5. One other passage could breed confusion in this con-
text. The Court quoted a paragraph from Crawford that included the state-
ment, “An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an ac-
quaintance does not,” Id. at 2274 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51 (2004)), and then said, “A limitation so clearly reflected in the 
text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely 
its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.” Id. In context, it is clear that the “limitation so 
clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision” is to testimonial 
statements, not to formal statements made to government officers. The pas-
sage addressed the question “whether the Confrontation Clause applies only 
to testimonial hearsay.” Id. As in Crawford, the Court offered formal state-
ments to government officers as the clearest example of testimonial state-
ments, not as the exclusive one; indeed, in the same discussion, the Court 
explicitly reserved the question “whether and when statements made to some-
one other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’” Id. 
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quirement. It merely lists the difference in formality as one of 
four factors justifying a different result between the two cases.54 
With respect to the Court’s response to Justice Thomas, it is im-
portant to note that declining to dispute a proposition is not the 
same thing as asserting it. Moreover, in the context in which the 
Court responded to Justice Thomas, the discussion was essen-
tially dictum, because it was not necessary for the Court to re-
solve whether there was a formality requirement; the discussion 
came during the Court’s analysis of Hammon, from which Jus-
tice Thomas dissented on the ground that the statement was not 
sufficiently formal, and the Court held that indeed it was.55 
The Davis opinion also contains three other passages that 
lend great force to the conclusion that either there is no formal-
ity requirement or, if there is one, it adds nothing to the re-
quirement that the statement be made in anticipation of prosecu-
torial use. First, the Court noted that most of the early cases 
imposing confrontation requirements “involved testimonial 
statements of the most formal sort—sworn testimony in prior ju-
dicial proceedings or formal depositions under oath—which in-
vites the argument that the scope of the Clause is limited to that 
very formal category.”56 
But the Court immediately rejected that argument: the Eng-
lish cases were not limited to “prior court testimony and formal 
depositions,”57 and the Court cited to the passage in Crawford in 
which it said, “We find it implausible that a provision which 
concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought 
                                                          
54 See id. at 2276-77. 
55 The Court said, in support of this conclusion, “It imports sufficient 
formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are criminal offenses.” Id. 
at 2278 n.5. Of course, the Court did not mean to suggest that if lies to po-
lice officers were not criminal offenses, then statements to them could not be 
testimonial. Among other problems, that rule would allow states to eviscerate 
the confrontation right. One could, for example, easily imagine a state de-
criminalizing false accusations of domestic violence made to the police, to 
protect alleged victims from the supposed threat of prosecution and (in fact) 
to obviate the necessity for them to testify subject to confrontation. 
56 Id. at 2275-76. 
57 Id. at 2276. 
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trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.”58 Similarly, 
the Davis Court added that it is not “conceivable that the protec-
tions of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by hav-
ing a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testi-
mony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a 
deposition.”59 Exactly right. This is why I have said that the ar-
gument for a formality requirement is wrong-headed. 
Second, in comparing Hammon with Crawford, the Court 
acknowledged that “the Crawford interrogation was more for-
mal,” but asserted that none of the features that made it so “was 
essential to the point” that Sylvia Crawford’s statements were 
testimonial.60 The Court noted that those features (that the inter-
rogation “followed a Miranda warning, was tape-recorded, and 
took place at the station-house”) “strengthened the statements’ 
testimonial aspect—made it more objectively apparent, that is, 
that the purpose of the exercise was to nail down the truth about 
past criminal events.”61 The Court then said that in Hammon 
“[i]t was formal enough that Amy’s interrogation was conducted 
in a separate room, away from her husband (who tried to inter-
vene), with the officer receiving her replies for use in his ‘inves-
tigat[ion].’”62 These factors do not fit easily in the “formal” 
category—but they clearly demonstrate that the shared under-
standing of the conversation was that Amy Hammon was creat-
ing evidence that would likely be used in prosecution. 
Finally, in responding to Justice Thomas, the Court criti-
cized a formality test, noting that his dissent “has not provided 
anything that deserves the description ‘workable’—unless one 
thinks that the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ state-
ments qualifies.”63 Moreover, the Court pointed out that Justice 
Thomas “even qualifies that vague distinction by acknowledging 
that the Confrontation Clause ‘also reaches the use of technically 
                                                          
58 541 U.S. at 52 n.3. 
59 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2275-76 (2006). 
60 Id. at 2278. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 2278 n.5 
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informal statements when used to evade the formalized proc-
ess’ . . . .”64 
Perhaps the Court believes that a statement that is testimonial 
in nature inevitably will be attended by some formal aspect, par-
ticularly if the Court’s conception of formality is very broad. Or 
perhaps all formal means to the Court in this context is that the 
circumstances are such as to give notice that the statement will 
be used in prosecution. In any event, it seems unlikely that the 
Court will interpret formality to mean more than a showing of 
such circumstances—which means that formality will turn out 
merely to be an odd way of phrasing what, under the optimal 
view, should be the critical question in determining whether a 
statement is testimonial. 
In short, it appears that Davis prescribes no stringent rule 
that a statement can be testimonial only if it is formal. If there is 
a formality requirement, it is satisfied by demonstrating that it 
was objectively apparent to the declarant that the interrogation 
was being held for prosecutorial purposes. 
IV.  THE OPINION THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN 
In this Part, I will summarize much of the discussion above 
by presenting a synopsis of what I might have produced had I 
been a law clerk under instructions to draft an opinion holding 
for Hammon but against Davis: 
 Petitioners ask us to adopt the principle that an 
accusation made to a known law enforcement officer 
is necessarily testimonial. For the most part, that 
principle holds, but we are unwilling to adopt it as an 
inflexible rule. Determining whether a statement is 
testimonial must take into account the actual circum-
stances of the declarant when she makes the state-
ment. In Davis, McCottry began speaking just after a 
frightening incident had occurred, while she was un-
protected and in clear distress, and while her alleged 
assailant was not only at large but nearby; thus, in 
                                                          
64 Id. (quoting in part Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
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describing his conduct, she began speaking in the 
present tense. We do not believe that, until she ac-
knowledged that he was driving away, the attention of 
a reasonable person in her position and in the heat of 
that moment would likely be focused on the ultimate 
prosecutorial use of her statement. From that moment 
on, but not until then, her statements should be 
deemed testimonial. 
 Hammon is a much easier case. By the time Amy 
Hammon made her accusation, she was with a police 
officer in one room and her husband was with an-
other officer in another room. The fact that the offi-
cer who was with her immediately asked for an affi-
davit simply confirmed what any reasonable person in 
her position would have understood already—that 
when she told a police officer that her husband had 
assaulted her, the statement was likely to be used for 
prosecution. 
Such an opinion would, I believe, have been less likely than 
is the actual Davis opinion to be manipulated by lower courts in 
favor of the prosecution. But there is nothing in Davis that pre-
vents the Supreme Court from interpreting the Confrontation 
Clause in the way this hypothetical draft does. Before Davis, it 
was apparent that a strong message from the Supreme Court was 
necessary to demonstrate that the lower courts should not treat 
the new doctrine staked out by Crawford as a mere linguistic cu-
rio that ultimately poses no insuperable obstacle to the same 
types of results that had been commonplace beforehand. The 
same remains true after Davis. 
V.  OTHER ISSUES 
The issues discussed thus far in this article will continue to 
be tremendously important in Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence. But there is a wide range of other issues that also will be 
very important and controversial and will need to be resolved in 
coming years. This Part sets forth a catalogue—which does not 
purport to be exhaustive—of some of these issues, together with 
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summary thoughts on each. Note that, although the first few of 
these bear on the question of what statements are testimonial, 
the others raise more procedural concerns. 
(1) To what extent should statements by government agents, 
including autopsy and laboratory reports, be considered testimo-
nial? It seems clear to me that such statements made in contem-
plation of prosecution of a particular crime must be considered 
testimonial. But courts have not always so held.65 
 (2) To what extent may statements other than to law en-
forcement personnel—to other government agents and to private 
persons—be characterized as testimonial? Davis, like Crawford, 
does not resolve the matter definitively. But a rule that only 
statements to law enforcement personnel or only to government 
agents could be considered testimonial would be a disaster. It 
would allow a witness to use another type of person as an inter-
mediary to relay testimony to court, and avoid the need to take 
an oath, face the accused, or submit to cross-examination. This 
scenario is not unrealistic; we may be sure that victims’ rights 
organizations would often seize the opportunity to relieve com-
plainants of the burdens of testifying in court. 
 (3) To what extent, if any, should the age, maturity, and 
mental condition of a declarant be considered in determining 
whether she can be a witness for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause and whether particular statements by her are testimonial? 
On the one hand, it may seem odd for the question of whether a 
statement is testimonial to be determined as if the declarant had 
the understanding of a competent adult when in fact she is a 
child or a person of deficient intelligence. On the other hand, if 
the standard for determining whether a statement is testimonial 
is based, as I believe it should be, on the perspective of a rea-
sonable person in the position of the declarant, then consistent 
                                                          
65 See, e.g., State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621 (Oh. 2006), cert. denied, 
127 S.Ct. 1374 (2007). 
 I would also consider as testimonial a certificate validating an instrument 
such as a radar gun, because it is made in contemplation of use in prosecu-
tions. That it is made in contemplation of multiple prosecutions does not 
seem to me to alter the situation materially. But see Rackoff v. State, 637 
S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 2006). This is, however, a closer question. 
FRIEDMAN.DOC 9/22/2007 12:33 AM 
574 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
application of the standard probably would require disregarding 
the particular declarant’s deficiencies. With respect to extremely 
young children, however, I believe that there is a plausible ar-
gument that they may be incapable of being witnesses within the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 
 (4) In what situations can the state be estopped from denying 
the testimonial nature of a statement because an interrogator or 
state agent withheld from the declarant information that would 
have made apparent the likely prosecutorial use of the conversa-
tion? Assuming, again, that the critical question is the 
understanding of a reasonable person in the position of the 
declarant, then the state or some other agent attempting to create 
evidence for prosecution will sometimes have an incentive to 
hide from a declarant the likely prosecutorial use of the 
declarant’s statements. Suppose the declarant is not suspected of 
wrongdoing, and the agent believes that she would make a 
conscientious decision not to volunteer testimony against the 
accused. Then if the agent hides the prosecutorial intent to 
secure a statement that would be testimonial, given knowledge 
of that intent, the state probably should be estopped from 
denying that the statement is in fact testimonial. But if the 
declarant makes the statement in furtherance of a criminal ac-
tivity, such as a conspiracy, then there should be no estoppel. 
 (5) To what extent, if any, may the state attempt to constrain 
exercises of the confrontation right intended only to impose costs 
on the prosecution? This strikes me as a very difficult topic. 
There are situations in which (a) a conscientious court would 
recognize that a given type of written statement is testimonial, 
but (b) the expense of producing the author as a live witness is 
considerable, and (c) the accused appears to have no plausible 
expectation that confrontation will do him any good. In such a 
situation, the accused may nevertheless be tempted to insist on 
the right to confrontation, reckoning that if producing the wit-
ness is costly to the prosecution but cost-free to the defense then 
the prospect of confrontation improves the accused’s bargaining 
power. Perhaps the state may attempt to restrain such exercises 
of the right, but this is far from clear. Moreover, defining what 
are acceptable constraints—perhaps some kind of good faith re-
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quirement—and the situations in which they may be imposed are 
not easy matters. I am not sure whether opening this Pandora’s 
box would be worthwhile in the end.66 
 (6) To what extent, if any, may the state impose on the ac-
cused the burden of securing an opportunity for confrontation? 
The state should be allowed to argue that the accused waives the 
confrontation right if he does not make a timely demand that the 
witness be produced. And perhaps, at least if the prosecution 
gives notice that it intends to rely on a witness but there is rea-
son to believe that the witness will not be available to testify at 
trial, the accused may be held to have waived the confrontation 
right if he does not demand an opportunity to depose the witness 
before trial. Beyond this, however, the accused should not be 
required to create his own opportunity to “be confronted with” 
(note the passive phrasing) an adverse witness. In particular, the 
confrontation rights of the accused should not be deemed satis-
fied by giving him the opportunity to subpoena the witness.67 
 (7) What standards govern the adequacy of a pretrial oppor-
tunity for cross-examination? One effect of Crawford, as courts, 
legislatures, and lawyers adjust to it, should be a substantial in-
crease in the number of depositions taken to preserve testimony. 
Suppose such a deposition is offered immediately after the inci-
dent in question, and by the time of trial the witness is unavail-
able to testify. In this situation, the accused may well contend 
that the early opportunity to examine the witness was inade-
quate. Such a contention, I believe, should be resolved not by a 
per se rule—either that early timing does or does not render the 
                                                          
66 See generally Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
67 This is the issue that was posed by the petition for certiorari in Pinks 
v. North Dakota, No. 06-564, unsuccessfully seeking review of State v. 
Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1150 
(2007). For further comments on the general issue, see Posting of Richard D. 
Friedman of “Shifting the Burden,” to the Confrontation Blog 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/03/shifting-burden.html (Mar. 
16, 2005, 3:27 EST), and “Shifting the Burden, Take 2,” 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2006/08/shifting-burden-take-2.html 
(Aug. 2, 2006, 2:15 EST). The latter entry also comments on Campbell. 
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opportunity inadequate—but on the facts of the particular case. 
That is, the accused should be required to demonstrate with par-
ticularity how a later opportunity for confrontation would have 
been materially superior. 
Another situation in which adequacy is an issue arises when 
the accused has a prior opportunity to examine the witness, but 
not necessarily the motivation to conduct the examination as if it 
were for trial purposes. This occurs, for example, in jurisdic-
tions that allow depositions for discovery; the lower courts are 
divided on the question of whether the opportunity to take a dis-
covery deposition suffices for the Confrontation Clause if the 
witness is unavailable at trial.68 If the answer is in the affirma-
tive, then a careful defense attorney will have to seize every op-
portunity to take a deposition, lest the witness becomes unavail-
able and a prior testimonial statement becomes admissible with 
no further opportunity for confrontation. This could radically in-
crease the expense of criminal proceedings. The prosecution 
probably should bear the burden of determining when there is a 
sufficiently strong chance that the witness will become unavail-
able to warrant a prompt confrontational proceeding. 
 (8) If the accused has been identified as a suspect and not 
arrested, or has not been identified, may the prosecution pre-
serve the testimony of a witness? Suppose the prosecution identi-
fies a person as a suspect in a murder but does not yet have 
enough evidence to arrest him, and a key witness may later be-
come unavailable. The prosecution ought to be able to preserve 
that witness’s testimony by giving the suspect notice and taking 
the witness’s deposition. Now suppose that the authorities have 
identified the suspect as the murderer, but that he has managed 
to avoid arrest. The state probably ought to be able to appoint 
counsel who could examine the witness at a deposition in case 
the witness later becomes unavailable. The accused has not had 
a chance to be face to face with the witness, but probably the 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., Corona v. State, 929 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(adequate); Lopez v. State, 888 So.2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (inade-
quate). California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), answers in the affirmative 
the corresponding question with respect to preliminary hearings. 
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accused should bear that risk in this situation. 
 The question becomes more difficult if the accused has not 
yet been identified. Even in this situation, it may be clear that 
whoever the accused is, the testimony of the witness would be 
harmful to him and in what way. If so, it is possible to imagine 
a solution. For example, suppose a pathologist performs an au-
topsy on a person who died of a gunshot wound and writes a re-
port concluding that the wound came from close range but was 
not self-inflicted. Whoever the eventual defendant may be, this 
statement—which I believe is clearly testimonial—will be harm-
ful to him. Now suppose the court appoints provisional counsel 
for the eventual (but as yet unidentified) defendant to examine 
the pathologist at a deposition. If the accused is later identified 
and brought to trial, and the pathologist is then unavailable, then 
the deposition should be admitted against the accused unless he 
is able to show at that time particular circumstances why the op-
portunity for cross-examination was inadequate given provisional 
counsel’s lack of knowledge at the time of the deposition of who 
his client was. 
 (9) To what extent does the Confrontation Clause apply to 
the sentencing phase of a capital case, and to what extent is 
there a right—based perhaps in the Due Process Clause—to con-
front declarants whose statements are testimonial in nature and 
are introduced against the accused in criminal proceedings other 
than the trial? John Douglass has argued that “the whole of the 
Sixth Amendment applies to the whole of a capital case.”69 
Thus, the confrontation right would apply not only at the guilt 
phase of a capital trial but also at the sentencing phase—
determining both whether the defendant is eligible for the death 
penalty and whether that penalty actually ought to be imposed. 
Not all courts have been willing to go that far.70 Beyond argu-
ments applicable only to capital cases—based on the unified na-
ture of capital trials at the time of the Framers—there is another 
                                                          
69 John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at 
Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1967 (2005). 
70 E.g., United States v. Fields, 2007 WL 926864 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778 (Nev. 2006). 
FRIEDMAN.DOC 9/22/2007 12:33 AM 
578 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
sort of argument that applies more broadly to other proceedings 
in a prosecution. Suppose that at a suppression hearing a witness 
for the prosecution gave direct testimony and then the court ex-
cused her on the ground that her testimony was too reliable to 
require cross-examination. Even if the Confrontation Clause 
does not apply to that hearing, it seems likely that denial of an 
opportunity for cross-examination would violate the accused’s 
constitutional rights. And if that is true, then at least arguably 
the same principle should apply if the witness gave testimony 
before rather than at the hearing. 
 (10) What standards and procedures should govern forfeiture 
of confrontation rights? Among the many important questions on 
this topic are the following: 
 (a) Must the conduct that allegedly rendered the witness 
unavailable to testify subject to confrontation have been moti-
vated in significant part by the accused’s desire to achieve that 
result? At least with respect to serious intentional wrongful con-
duct by the accused, the answer should be negative. The idea 
behind the forfeiture doctrine is that the accused cannot com-
plain about a situation caused by his own wrongdoing.71 For ex-
ample, if the witness is unavailable because the accused mur-
dered her, it should not be a defense to a forfeiture argument to 
say that the accused did not murder her for the purpose of ren-
dering her unavailable.72 
 (b) May the conduct that allegedly rendered the witness 
unavailable to testify subject to confrontation have been the same 
conduct with which the accused is charged? Yes. There is no 
good reason why not. The argument that applying forfeiture doc-
trine in this context would be question-begging—that is, assum-
ing the matter at issue—is based on a misconception. The judge 
determines the question of forfeiture. The jury (if there is one) 
determines guilt. Those are separate determinations. If both de-
                                                          
71 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chut-
zpa, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 506, 516-21 (1997), available at 
http://www.personal.umich.edu/~rdfrdman/friedman.pdf. 
72 E.g., State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 34-35 (Wis. 2007); People v. 
Giles, 55 Cal. Rptr.3d 133 (2007). 
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pend, at least in part, on the same factual issue, so be it. 
 (c) May the challenged statement itself be used in demon-
strating forfeiture? Yes. Under the principle of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 104(a), the judge in determining a preliminary issue of 
fact may rely on any evidence not privileged.73 That includes the 
statement in issue. Now, of course, the accused contends that 
the statement is testimonial in nature (and unless it is, there is 
no need to reach the forfeiture issue). Under the principle dis-
cussed above, the confrontation right might be held to apply 
even at this preliminary hearing.74 Logically, then, there appears 
to be an infinite regress. In the end, though, the court will de-
cide either that the accused has forfeited the right or that he has 
not. In the first case, use of the statement both at the prelimi-
nary hearing and at trial does not violate the accused’s rights 
and in the second case, the statement will not be presented at 
trial, so there will not be a violation. 
 (d) What is the standard of persuasion for demonstrating 
that the accused forfeited the confrontation right? It may be that 
the Supreme Court will require only that the prosecution satisfy 
the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in proving the fac-
tual predicates for forfeiture—that is, demonstrate that those 
predicates are more likely true than not.75 Given the right at 
stake, a higher standard, perhaps “clear and convincing evi-
dence,” might be more appropriate. 
 (e) To what extent is the prosecution foreclosed from 
claiming forfeiture because it failed to mitigate the problem? In 
particular, 
  (i) If the witness is dead, when is the prosecution fore-
closed from claiming forfeiture if it did not arrange for a deposi-
tion? It may seem grotesque to arrange for a deposition of a dy-
ing person, but the authorities have never shown much 
compunction about taking a statement from a victim even in the 
final moments of life. Certainly if the victim lingers for days 
                                                          
73 Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). 
74 See supra pp. 124-25. 
75 Cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (holding that preponderance 
standard is sufficient constitutionally for determining voluntariness of confes-
sion).  
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while still communicative, and arguably for a shorter period, the 
prosecution ought to arrange a deposition.76 
  (ii) If the prosecution is contending that the witness is 
intimidated, what procedures must the government pursue to as-
sure that as much of the confrontation right as possible has been 
preserved? For example, to what extent must it exert coercion 
against the witness, and must it attempt to secure cross-
examination without the witness’ testimony? These questions can 
be excruciatingly difficult. The court probably should not con-
clude that the witness is unavailable to testify because the ac-
cused has intimidated her unless the court has attempted to com-
pel the witness to testify—not simply by serving her with a 
subpoena, but by enforcing it, if necessary, with the contempt 
sanction. This is not a move that a court can take lightly unless 
it is very confident that it can protect the witness. And it is uni-
maginable in the case of a child witness—though the court 
should consider sanctions against anyone who has exerted influ-
ence over the child to prevent her from testifying.  
The matter is complicated because, even if the witness is 
unwilling to testify in the usual manner—in the presence of the 
accused and subject to cross-examination, in open court at trial—
that does not mean that no aspect of the confrontation right can 
be preserved. To the extent that the state has not attempted all 
reasonable means of securing the witness’ testimony subject to 
some form of confrontation, the conclusion that the accused has 
caused the lack of confrontation should be deemed erroneous as 
a matter of constitutional law. Perhaps at an earlier time the 
witness would have been willing to testify at a deposition, and 
so arguably the prosecution should be held accountable for fail-
ing to offer one then if it had information suggesting that she 
might be unwilling to testify later. Also, perhaps the witness 
would be willing to testify subject to cross-examination so long 
as the accused was not present or in the judge’s chambers, and 
                                                          
76 See Posting of Richard D. Friedman, “Forfeiture, the Prosecutorial 
Duty to Mitigate, and Rae Carruth,” to The Confrontation Blog, 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2005/03/forfeiture-prosecutorial-duty-
to.html (March 4, 2005, 3:39 EST). 
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these possibilities ought to be explored. 
If forfeiture doctrine is left unconstrained, it could swallow 
much of the confrontation right. I do not believe that the proper 
method for constraining forfeiture doctrine lies in artificially 
limiting the type of misconduct that can be considered to forfeit 
the right, or limiting the type of evidence that can be used to 
prove forfeiture. An elevated standard of persuasion might be of 
some help, but probably not very much. The key, I believe, is 
to require that before the court concludes that the accused has 
forfeited the confrontation right, the state (including the prosecu-
tion and the court) must take reasonable steps to preserve how-
ever much of the confrontation right as is feasible. 
VI.  PEDAGOGY AND LAW REFORM 
This Part will set forth a few interrelated thoughts transcend-
ing the application of Crawford and Davis to criminal prosecu-
tions. I will approach these from the point of pedagogy, but my 
interest goes beyond the relatively parochial question of how law 
professors should teach this material to practical, though long-
term, matters of law reform. 
First, should the confrontation right be addressed in courses 
in Criminal Procedure or in Evidence, or in both? I firmly be-
lieve the answer is both. Crawford makes clear that the confron-
tation right is not a mere rule of evidence but a fundamental 
principle of procedure.77 Therefore, it has significant procedural 
consequences long before a case ever comes to trial. For exam-
ple, Crawford should push criminal justice systems more in the 
direction of facilitating depositions for the preservation of testi-
mony. 
At the same time, the confrontation right must occupy a sig-
nificant place in a course on Evidence. Before Crawford, many 
Evidence teachers spent a great deal of time on the rule against 
                                                          
77 541 U.S. at 42 (“bedrock procedural guarantee”). See also id. at 61 
(“[T]he Clause ‘is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It com-
mands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a par-
ticular manner . . . .’”). 
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hearsay and little or no time on the confrontation right. This ap-
proach always struck me as intellectually timid, because to a 
very large extent when the rule against hearsay justifiably calls 
for exclusion of evidence, the driving force is the confrontation 
right. Even so, before Crawford the approach could be justified 
on pragmatic grounds by teachers who did not want to look be-
yond the law as it then stood, for the confrontation right rarely 
required exclusion of evidence that standard hearsay doctrine 
would permit. After Crawford, however, the confrontation right 
clearly has independent force. In my view, this change makes it 
utterly irresponsible to teach hearsay law without spending a 
great deal of time on the confrontation right, if for no other rea-
son than that the right effectively preempts many of the results 
that hearsay law might otherwise seem to prescribe. It would be 
absurd, for example, to spend time examining the “excited ut-
terance” exception and all the expansive interpretations that 
courts have given it without recognizing that many of those ap-
plications are now rendered unconstitutional. 
And now, in light of Davis, I will make a stronger state-
ment: It does not make much sense to teach confrontation after 
teaching hearsay. Rather, the two should be integrated, with the 
confrontation right being emphasized first—just as historically it 
was well developed long before modern hearsay law took 
shape—and driving the organization of coverage. Again, taking 
the hearsay exception for excited utterances as an example, it 
clearly would be a mistake to work through its contours and 
only at some later time say, “Many of those applications really 
do not matter, because they would be unconstitutional.” 
Evidence teachers are going to have to work out a sound in-
tegrated approach over time, but here is what tentatively strikes 
me as a sensible approach: 
(1) The natural starting point is the basic confrontation prin-
ciple enunciated by Crawford—that testimonial statements cannot 
be used against an accused if he has not had (or forfeited) an 
opportunity for confrontation.78 Thus, after an historical nod to 
                                                          
78 541 U.S. at 62, 68. 
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cases like Raleigh,79 Crawford itself is a good place to begin. 
(2) Then it makes sense to delve into the question of what 
“testimonial” means, and this of course calls for discussion of 
Davis. This also would be a good time to discuss the difference 
between accomplice confessions, which are testimonial, and con-
spirator statements, which are not testimonial—in my view be-
cause they are not made in anticipation of prosecutorial use. 
Other bounds on the doctrine may then be examined.80 
(3) When does a testimonial statement not pose a confronta-
tion problem because it is offered for some ground other than 
the truth of a matter it asserts? Tennessee v. Street81 is a natural 
case for discussion here, as are questions such as whether or 
when a testimonial statement may be admitted in support of an 
expert opinion82 or to show the course of an investigation.83 
(4) Is the confrontation problem really relieved, as the Su-
preme Court held in California v. Green84 and reaffirmed in 
Crawford,85 by the appearance of the witness at trial, even 
though the witness does not testify to the substance of the prior 
statement? Understanding this problem helps one realize why, as 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), rulemakers have hesi-
tated to eliminate the hearsay bar to all prior statements of a 
witness who testifies at trial.86 
(5) When should a witness be deemed unavailable? Several 
of the Supreme Court’s pre-Crawford cases—including Ohio v. 
Roberts87—are still good law on this point, and Federal Rule of 
                                                          
79 Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603). 
80 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
81 471 U.S. 409 (1985). 
82 See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005). 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2006). 
84 399 U.S. 149, 157-67 (1970). 
85 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). 
86 Rule 801(d)(1) exempts from the hearsay rule limited categories of 
prior statements of a trial witness—some prior inconsistent statements, some 
prior consistent statements, and most prior statements of identification—but 
does not create a general exemption for prior statements of a trial witness. 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). 
87 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980) (holding (dubiously) that the witness whose 
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Evidence 804(a), which prescribes standards of unavailability for 
purposes of the hearsay rule, could be discussed here. 
(6) What is an adequate opportunity for cross-examination? 
Materials related to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) may 
come in here,88 as does the interesting question of whether a dis-
covery deposition suffices for the confrontation right.89 
(7) What constitutes a sufficient ground for forfeiture, and 
what procedures must be followed before the right may be 
deemed forfeited? Cases involving dying declarations would fit 
in well here.90 
This outline demonstrates that a full exploration of issues re-
lated to the confrontation right does not depend on prior exami-
nation of hearsay law. On the contrary, not only does the con-
frontation right stand on its own, but discussion of the 
confrontation right helps explain some aspects of hearsay doc-
trine; in some cases the discussion may give the doctrine better 
grounding and in others it may help expose its weaknesses. 
After this canvass of the confrontation right, it is possible to 
work relatively quickly through the most significant issues re-
lated to hearsay when the confrontation right is not at issue. Not 
only as teachers, but also as scholars and potential law reform-
ers, the question we should constantly be asking in this realm is, 
“Is this really necessary?” That is, once we have protected the 
confrontation right, as Crawford does, by a separately articu-
lated doctrine that does not depend on hearsay law, do we need 
the elaborate structure of hearsay doctrine with its complex defi-
                                                          
prior testimonial statement was at issue was unavailable under the circum-
stances). 
88 That Rule excepts a statement from the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable to testify at trial, the statement is prior testimony, and “the party 
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceed-
ing, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to de-
velop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 
804(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
89 Compare Corona v. State, 929 So. 2d 588, 595-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006), with Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046, 1053-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
90 E.g., State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kans. 2004). 
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nition of hearsay and its remarkably long and intricate set of ex-
emptions? My own feeling is that outside the context in which 
the confrontation right properly applies—testimonial statements 
offered against criminal defendants—much hearsay ought to be 
admitted, and that to the extent exclusion is warranted it ought 
to be under a doctrine much more open-textured than the one we 
have now. 
Probably, a softer form of the confrontation doctrine should 
apply to testimonial statements offered against litigants other 
than a criminal defendant. Working out the shape of such a doc-
trine could be a significant challenge for the next generation of 
evidence scholarship. Beyond that, the judgment of admissibility 
should depend on a case-by-case assessment of factors such as 
the probative value of the statement, the probability that cross-
examination would be useful, and the relative abilities of the 
parties to produce the declarant as a live witness.91 
Indeed, I am hopeful that over the next few decades pressure 
will mount to move hearsay law in this direction. I base this 
hope on anticipation that, now that hearsay law is no longer 
necessary to do the work that the Confrontation Clause should 
perform, its silliness and superfluousness will become more ap-
parent. And I believe the development will be advanced greatly 
if Evidence teachers organize coverage around the confrontation 
right and then ask, “What further hearsay law, if any, do we 
need?” 
                                                          
91 Some years ago, in two articles, one bearing a particularly unfortunate 
name, I made a preliminary attempt to reconceptualize the hearsay doctrine, 
outside the context where the Confrontation Clause applies, according to the 
factors suggested in the text. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial 
Economic, Game-theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723 
(1992); Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hear-
say Issues, 13 CARD. L. REV. 883 (1991). I believe much of the analysis in 
those articles remains sound, but I did not then explore the possibility of a 
softer form of confrontation doctrine applying to testimonial statements of-
fered against parties other than a criminal defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The pair of cases decided under the name of Davis confirms that 
Crawford is for real. That is, Crawford not only requires courts to 
adopt a new way of thinking and expressing themselves about the 
Confrontation Clause, but it also causes a change of results, even 
some results that courts had reached routinely and almost casually 
in recent years. The result in Hammon is one of those; before 
Crawford, Amy Hammon’s statement was easily admissible, and af-
ter Crawford the statement is quite plainly inadmissible. 
Ideally, the court would have reversed the conviction in Davis 
itself on the basis that an accusation made to a law-enforcement of-
ficer is testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. The facts of 
that case, however, made reversal unappealing. The Court could 
have written an opinion holding that the statements at issue were not 
testimonial but explicitly examining the matter from the point of 
view of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant; an 
opinion taking this approach might have relied on the perception 
that in the heat of the moment a reasonable person in McCottry’s 
position would not have anticipated evidentiary use of her state-
ments. The opinion actually written by the Court is consistent with 
that approach, however. Similarly, although the Court did not deny 
that a statement must be formal to be testimonial, the opinion may 
easily be read not to create a formality requirement that has inde-
pendent significance. 
 Fresh accusations will continue to create controversial ques-
tions under Crawford, but there is a wide variety of other issues, 
many of them procedural, that must be resolved before we have a 
sturdy, comprehensive doctrine of the Confrontation Clause. The 
process will take decades, and it will require repeated intervention 
by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, even as the courts are reconcep-
tualizing the confrontation right, academics should consider possible 
transformations in the law of hearsay. Now that the confrontation 
right has its own independent footing, hearsay law is not necessary 
to protect it. Much of the law of hearsay that does not involve tes-
timonial statements should wither away over the next few decades. 
What remains should bear none of the complexity and haphazard 
quality that have plagued generations of students and lawyers. 
